Calmness of a perturbed Cournot Oligopoly Game with nonsmooth cost functions

This article deals with the calmness of a solution map of a Cournot Oligopoly Game with nonsmooth cost functions. The fact that the cost functions are not supposed to be differentiable allows for considering cases where some firms have diferent units of production, which have diferent marginal costs. In order to obtain results about the calmness, we use a new technique which allows for proving the metric subregularity of a multifunction. This technique is based on an outer coderivative and on a mathematical induction on the dimension of the vectorial space. I think that the proof methodology that we use can be replicated in order to study the metric subregularity and the calmness of multifunctions in a more general case.

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