Analysis of Energy Markets Modeled as Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints

Equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints are challenging both theoretically and computationally. However, they are suitable/adequate modeling formulations in a number of important areas, such as energy markets, transportation planning, and logistics. Typically, these problems are characterized as bilevel Nash-Cournot games. For instance, determin- ing the equilibrium price in an energy market involves top-level decisions of … Read more

Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets

We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of restructured electricity markets, with locational marginal prices. Each player in this game faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. The corresponding game is an example of an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for … Read more