Nash Equilibrium in a Pay-as-bid Electricity Market: Part 2 – Best Response of a Producer

We consider a multi-leader-common-follower model of a pay-as-bid electricity market in which the producers provide the regulator with either linear or quadratic bids. We prove that for a given producer only linear bids can maximise his profit. Such linear bids are referred as the “best response” of the given producer. They are obtained assuming the … Read more

Nash Equilibrium in a Pay-as-bid Electricity Market: Part 1 – Existence and Characterisation

We consider a model of a pay-as-bid electricity market based on a multi-leader-common-follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator as a common follower is at the lower level. We fully characterise Nash equilibria for this model by describing necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence as well … Read more

Normally admissible stratifications and calculation of normal cones to a finite union of polyhedral sets

This paper considers computation of Fr\’echet and limiting normal cones to a finite union of polyhedra. To this aim, we introduce a new concept of normally admissible stratification which is convenient for calculations of such cones and provide its basic properties. We further derive formulas for the above mentioned cones and compare our approach to … Read more