Didier Aussel In this tutorial we consider single-leader-multi-follower games in which the models of the lower-level players have polyhedral feasible sets and convex objective functions. This situation allows for classic KKT reformulations of the separate lower-level problems, which lead to challenging single-level reformulations of MPCC type. The main contribution of this tutorial is to present a ready-to-use … Read more
We consider a multi-leader-common-follower model of a pay-as-bid electricity market in which the producers provide the regulator with either linear or quadratic bids. We prove that for a given producer only linear bids can maximise his profit. Such linear bids are referred as the “best response” of the given producer. They are obtained assuming the … Read more
We consider a model of a pay-as-bid electricity market based on a multi-leader-common-follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator as a common follower is at the lower level. We fully characterise Nash equilibria for this model by describing necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence as well … Read more