Are Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Problems Particular Cases of Bilevel Optimization?

For more than 20 years, single-leader multi-follower (SLMF) problems have been treated as a more difficult class of problems in comparison to bilevel optimization. In this work we challenge this common belief, studying whether SLMF problems can be reformulated as equivalent bilevel optimization problems. We consider both optimistic and pessimistic formulations. For the optimistic case … Read more

A Tutorial on Solving Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Problems using SOS1 Reformulations

In this tutorial we consider single-leader-multi-follower games in which the models of the lower-level players have polyhedral feasible sets and convex objective functions. This situation allows for classic KKT reformulations of the separate lower-level problems, which lead to challenging single-level reformulations of MPCC type. The main contribution of this tutorial is to present a ready-to-use … Read more

Nash Equilibrium in a Pay-as-bid Electricity Market: Part 1 – Existence and Characterisation

We consider a model of a pay-as-bid electricity market based on a multi-leader-common-follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator as a common follower is at the lower level. We fully characterise Nash equilibria for this model by describing necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence as well … Read more

Nash Equilibrium in a Pay-as-bid Electricity Market: Part 2 – Best Response of a Producer

We consider a multi-leader-common-follower model of a pay-as-bid electricity market in which the producers provide the regulator with either linear or quadratic bids. We prove that for a given producer only linear bids can maximise his profit. Such linear bids are referred as the “best response” of the given producer. They are obtained assuming the … Read more