Vikas Vikram Singh Markov decision process (MDP) is a decision making framework where a decision maker is interested in maximizing the expected discounted value of a stream of rewards received at future stages at various states which are visited according to a controlled Markov chain. Many algorithms including linear programming methods are available in the literature to compute … Read more
This paper shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium of an n-player chance-constrained game for elliptically symmetric distributions. For a certain class of payoff functions, we suitably construct an equivalent mathematical program whose global maximizer is a Nash equilibrium. ArticleDownload View PDF
We consider an n-player non-cooperative game where each player has expected value payoff function and her strategy set is defined by a joint chance constraint. The random constraint vectors are independent. We propose a subset of probability distributions from elliptical family of distributions. We consider the case when the probability distribution of each random constraint … Read more
We consider a two player zero-sum game with stochastic linear constraints. The probability distributions of the vectors associated with the constraints are partially known. The available information with respect to the distribution is based mainly on the two first moments. In this vein, we formulate the stochastic linear constraints as distributionally robust chance constraints. We … Read more
This paper studies an n-player non-cooperative game with strategy sets defined by stochastic linear constraints. The stochastic constraints of each player are jointly satisfied with a probability exceeding a given threshold. We consider the case where the row vectors defining the constraints are independent random vectors whose probability distributions are not completely known and belong … Read more
We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case … Read more
We consider a two player finite strategic zero-sum game where each player has stochastic linear constraints. We formulate the stochastic constraints of each player as chance constraints. We show the existence of a saddle point equilibrium if the row vectors of the random matrices, defining the stochastic constraints of each player, are elliptically symmetric distributed … Read more
We consider a two player bimatrix game where the entries of the payoff matrices are random variables. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by considering that the payoff of each player is defined using a chance constraint. We consider the case where the entries of the payoff matrices are independent normal/Cauchy random variables. … Read more
We consider an n-player finite strategic game. The payoff vector of each player is a random vector whose distribution is not completely known. We assume that the distribution of a random payoff vector of each player belongs to a distributional uncertainty set. We define a distributionally robust chance-constrained game using worst-case chance constraint. We consider … Read more
We consider an n-player strategic game with finite action sets. The payoffs of each player are random variables. We assume that each player uses a satisficing payoff criterion defined by a chance-constraint, i.e., players face a chance- constrained game. We consider the cases where payoffs follow normal and elliptically symmetric distributions. For both cases we … Read more