Exact Equilibrium Analysis of Sparse Network Games in Subexponential Time

In October 2026 two independent groups claimed deterministic algorithms that count the satisfying assignments of a k-CNF formula in time 2^{o(n)}, refuting the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH). We ask what these claims imply for the exact analysis of equilibria in games where each player interacts with a bounded number of others. Conditional on the claimed … Read more

String-averaging bargaining in solidarity cooperative games

We consider the situation that the grand set of all players, in a cooperative game in characteristic function form with a nonempty core, consists of recognizable subsets of players. The underlying assumption is that the players of each subset have something in common between themselves which is not shared by the players of other subsets. … Read more

Are Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Problems Particular Cases of Bilevel Optimization?

For more than 20 years, single-leader multi-follower (SLMF) problems have been treated as a more difficult class of problems in comparison to bilevel optimization. In this work we challenge this common belief, studying whether SLMF problems can be reformulated as equivalent bilevel optimization problems. We consider both optimistic and pessimistic formulations. For the optimistic case … Read more

The fixed-point bundle method over product-of-simplex domains arising from game equilibria

Developing general-purpose algorithms with global asymptotic convergence guarantees for Nash equilibria of general-sum games remains a longstanding challenge. This paper extends the fixed-point bundle framework for finite-dimensional variational inequalities (VIs) from simplex domains to product-of-simplex domains, enabling its direct application to Nash equilibrium computation. The resulting fixed-point bundle exhibits a composite fiber bundle structure. The … Read more

Solving Quasi-Variational Inequalities Using the Progressive Decoupling of Linkages

Inspired by the progressive decoupling of linkages methodology for optimization and variational inequalities, we propose an algorithm for solving quasi-variational inequalities as a sequence of variational inequalities. Our method is shown to converge locally under some regularity conditions and globally when such conditions hold throughout the entire domain. Separately, under other type of assumptions, global … Read more

When do Mixed-Integer Games Admit Rational Equilibria?

We consider mixed-integer linear-quadratic generalized Nash equilibrium problems, i.e., games in which each player solves a mixed-integer program subject to linear constraints in her own and rivals’ strategies as well as an objective which is quadratic in her own strategies and bilinear in her own and rivals’ strategies. For this class of games, we study … Read more

An Interpretable Ensemble Heuristic for Principal-Agent Games with Machine Learning

This paper addresses the challenge of enhancing public policy decision-making by efficiently solving principal-agent models (PAMs) for public-private partnerships, a critical yet computationally demanding problem. We develop a fast, interpretable, and generalizable approach to support policy decisions under these settings. We propose an interpretable ensemble heuristic (EH) that integrates Machine Learning (ML), Operations Research (OR), … Read more

On Stationary Conditions and the Convergence of Augmented Lagrangian methods for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

In this work, we study stationarity conditions and constraint qualifications (CQs) tailored to Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) and analyze their relationships and implications for the global convergence of algorithms. We recall that GNEPs generalize Nash Equilibrium Problems (NEPs) in that the feasible strategy set of each player depends on the strategies chosen by the … Read more

Robust Admission Via Two-Stage Stable Matching Under Ranking Uncertainty

We study a two-stage admission and assignment problem under uncertainty arising in university admission systems. In the first stage, applicants are admitted to an initial two-year program. In the second stage, admitted applicants are assigned to degree programs through an articulation mechanism subject to capacity constraints. Uncertainty stems from the academic performance of admitted applicants … Read more

A One-Extra Player Reduction of GNEPs to NEPs

It is common opinion that generalized Nash equilibrium problems are harder than Nash equilibrium problems. In this work, we show that by adding a new player, it is possible to reduce many generalized problems to standard equilibrium problems. The reduction holds for linear problems and smooth convex problems verifying a Slater-type condition. We also derive … Read more