Game Theory

An Interpretable Ensemble Heuristic for Principal-Agent Games with Machine Learning

  • I. Esra Buyuktahtakin Toy
    • Categories Applications - OR and Management Sciences, Game Theory, Optimization in Data Science

    This paper addresses the challenge of enhancing public policy decision-making by efficiently solving principal-agent models (PAMs) for public-private partnerships, a critical yet computationally demanding problem. We develop a fast, interpretable, and generalizable approach to support policy decisions under these settings. We propose an interpretable ensemble heuristic (EH) that integrates Machine Learning (ML), Operations Research (OR), … Read more

    On Stationary Conditions and the Convergence of Augmented Lagrangian methods for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

  • Lennin Mallma Ramirez
  • Frank Navarro Rojas
  • Alberto Ramos
    • Categories Constrained Nonlinear Optimization, Game Theory, Nonlinear Optimization Tags , , , ,

    In this work, we study stationarity conditions and constraint qualifications (CQs) tailored to Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) and analyze their relationships and implications for the global convergence of algorithms. We recall that GNEPs generalize Nash Equilibrium Problems (NEPs) in that the feasible strategy set of each player depends on the strategies chosen by the … Read more

    Robust Admission Via Two-Stage Stable Matching Under Ranking Uncertainty

  • Gustavo Angulo
    • Categories Game Theory, Integer Programming, Robust Optimization Tags , , ,

    We study a two-stage admission and assignment problem under uncertainty arising in university admission systems. In the first stage, applicants are admitted to an initial two-year program. In the second stage, admitted applicants are assigned to degree programs through an articulation mechanism subject to capacity constraints. Uncertainty stems from the academic performance of admitted applicants … Read more

    A One-Extra Player Reduction of GNEPs to NEPs

  • Henri Lefebvre
  • David Salas
  • Martin Schmidt
    • Categories Convex Optimization, Game Theory, Integer Programming Tags , , , ,

    It is common opinion that generalized Nash equilibrium problems are harder than Nash equilibrium problems. In this work, we show that by adding a new player, it is possible to reduce many generalized problems to standard equilibrium problems. The reduction holds for linear problems and smooth convex problems verifying a Slater-type condition. We also derive … Read more

    Minimal Regret Walras Equilibria for Combinatorial Markets

  • Alois Duguet
  • Tobias Harks
  • Martin Schmidt
  • Julian Schwarz
    • Categories Game Theory Tags , , , , ,

    We consider combinatorial multi-item markets and propose the notion of a ∆-regret Walras equilibrium, which is an allocation of items to players and a set of item prices that achieve the following goals: prices clear the market, the allocation is capacity-feasible, and the players’ strategies lead to a total regret of ∆. The regret is … Read more

    Branch-and-Cut for Computing Approximate Equilibria of Mixed-Integer Generalized Nash Games

  • Alois Duguet
  • Tobias Harks
  • Martin Schmidt
  • Julian Schwarz
    • Categories (Mixed) Integer Nonlinear Programming, Branch and Cut Algorithms, Game Theory Tags , , , ,

    Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables constitute an important class of games in which each player solves a mixed-integer optimization problem, where both the objective and the feasible set is parameterized by the rivals’ strategies. However, such games are known for failing to admit exact equilibria and also the assumption of all players being … Read more

    A guided tour through the zoo of paired optimization problems

  • Oliver Stein
    • Categories Bilevel Optimization, Game Theory, Nonlinear Optimization Tags , , , , , , , , ,

    Many mathematical models base on the coupling of two or more optimization problems. This paper surveys possibilities to couple two optimization problems and discusses how solutions of the different models are interrelated with each other. The considered pairs stem from the fields of standard and generalized Nash equilibrium problems, optimistic and pessimistic bilevel problems, saddle … Read more

    A linearly convergent algorithm for variational inequalities based on fiber bundle

  • Hongbo Sun
    • Categories Complementarity and Variational Inequalities, Game Theory Tags , , ,

    The variational inequality (VI) problem is a fundamental mathematical framework for many classical problems. This paper introduces an algorithm that applies to arbitrary finite-dimensional VIs with general compact convex sets and general continuous functions. The algorithm guarantees global linear convergence to an approximate solution without requiring any assumptions, including the typical monotonicity. Our approach adapts … Read more

    Inspection Games with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Resources

  • Bobak McCann
  • Mathieu Dahan
    • Categories Game Theory, Linear Programming, Stochastic Programming Tags , , , ,

    We study a two-player zero-sum inspection game with incomplete information, where an inspector deploys resources to maximize the expected damage value of detected illegal items hidden by an adversary across capacitated locations. Inspection and illegal resources differ in their detection capabilities and damage values. Both players face uncertainty regarding each other’s available resources, modeled via … Read more

    Collection points placement in urban delivery: A game-theoretic analysis of public and competitive strategies

  • Fabio Mercurio
  • Margarida Carvalho
  • S.U.K Rohmer
  • Loe Schlicher
  • Tom Van Woensel
    • Categories Facility Planning and Design, Game Theory Tags , , , ,

    Collection point networks are rapidly expanding as delivery companies and public authorities promote their implementation to consolidate deliveries and reduce urban congestion. However, rather than catering to public interest by maximizing accessibility, the placement of collection points remains primarily driven by competition among delivery companies, which seek to maximize their market share. This paper thus … Read more