Collection point networks are rapidly expanding as delivery companies and public authorities promote their implementation to consolidate deliveries and reduce urban congestion.
However, rather than catering to public interest by maximizing accessibility, the placement of collection points remains primarily driven by competition among delivery companies, which seek to maximize their market share. This paper thus aims to investigate how delivery companies strategically open collection points in response to competitors and how their decisions diverge from an optimal public placement. In this context, we propose a competitive location model where collection points are placed within a network of districts and a multinomial logit framework is used to model customer choices. In this competitive setting, we analyze the Nash equilibria and measure potential inefficiencies using the price of stability. This analysis includes a theoretical two-district setting, where we find a significant mismatch between competitive and optimal public placement, leading to potential efficiency losses of up to 33%. In contrast, a case study based on a Dutch city shows a narrower difference between public and strategic placements. At the same time, this case study illustrates that it is not easy for authorities to close the gap between public and strategic placements, for example, by promoting the attractiveness of all or those collection points of particular interest to a public authority.