auction – Optimization Online

Simple and Effective: A Deterministic Auction with Support Information

Published: 2024/09/30

Applications - OR and Management Sciences, Finance and Economics, Yield Management approximation, auction, distributional ambiguity, mechanism design

We study an auction design problem where a seller aims to sell a single item to multiple bidders with independent private values. The seller knows only an upper bound on these values and does not know their distribution. The objective is to devise a deterministic auction mechanism effective across a broad set of distributions. We … Read more

Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design

Published: 2017/04/20, Updated: 2019/05/29

Robust Optimization ambiguity aversion, auction, distributionally robust optimization, knightian preferences, mechanism design

We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other bidders. The agents perceive the ensemble of all bidder values as a random vector governed by an ambiguous probability distribution, which belongs … Read more