Fighting Terrorism: How to position Rapid Response Teams?

In light of recent terrorist attacks, we introduce and study a Stackelberg game between a government and a terrorist. In this game, the government positions a number of heavily-armed rapid response teams on a line segment (e.g., a long boulevard or shopping avenue) and then the terrorist attacks a location with the highest damage. This … Read more

Risk-Averse Bi-Level Stochastic Network Interdiction Model for Cyber-Security Risk Management

Security of cyber networks is crucial; recent severe cyber-attacks have had a devastating effect on many large organizations. The attack graph, which maps the potential attack paths of a cyber network, is a popular tool for analyzing cyber system vulnerability. In this study, we propose a bi-level stochastic network interdiction model on an attack graph … Read more

A Non-metric Bilevel Location Problem

We address a bilevel location problem where a leader first decides which facilities to open and their access prices; then, customers make individual decisions minimizing individual costs. In this note we prove that, when access costs do not fulfill metric properties, the problem is NP-hard even if facilities can be opened at no fixed cost. … Read more