core

Stable Matchings for A Generalized Marriage Problem

  • Somdeb Lahiri
    • Categories Finance and Economics, Game Theory Tags , , , ,

    We show that a simple genralization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show, that any outcome of this prcedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e., there is no other outcome which all men prefer … Read more

    Stable Sets of Weak Tournaments

  • Somdeb Lahiri
    • Categories Applications - OR and Management Sciences, Game Theory, Multi-Criteria Optimization Tags ,

    The purpose of this paper is to obtain conditions on weak tournaments, which guarantee that every non-empty subset of alternatives admits a stable set. We show that every stable set always contains the core. We also show that there exists a unique stable set for each non-empty subset of alternatives which coincides with its core … Read more