This paper is on practical solutions to the multi-objective optimization problem; it advocates for single-point solutions either of the Nash equilibrium or the Tchebycheff compromise type, depending on whether one can reasonably ascribe competition or cooperation to the problem at hand. A transform method that greatly simplifies implementation of the compromise solution is presented and … Read more
In this work we address a game theoretic variant of the Subset Sum problem, in which two decision makers (agents/players) compete for the usage of a common resource represented by a knapsack capacity. Each agent owns a set of integer weighted items and wants to maximize the total weight of its own items included in … Read more
In this work, we present new insights into the dynamic stability of electricity markets. In particular, we discuss how short forecast horizons, incomplete gaming, and physical ramping constraints can give rise to stability issues. Using basic concepts of market efficiency, Lyapunov stability, and predictive control, we construct a new stabilizing market design. A numerical case … Read more
We present a game-theoretical dynamic model for competitive electricity markets.We demonstrate that the model can be used to systematically analyze the effects of ramp constraints, initial conditions, dynamic disturbances, forecast horizon, bidding frequency, and some other factors on the price signals.We illustrate the capabilities of the model using a numerical case study ArticleDownload View PDF
A notorious open problem in the field of rendezvous search is to decide the rendezvous value of the symmetric rendezvous search problem on the line, when the initial distance apart between the two players is 2. We show that the symmetric rendezvous value is within the interval (4.1520, 4.2574), which considerably improves the previous best … Read more
In this paper we investigate the properties of the sampled version of the fictitious play algorithm, familiar from game theory, for games with identical payoffs, and propose a heuristic based on fictitious play as a solution procedure for discrete optimization problems of the form $\max\{u(y):y=(y^1,\ldots,y^n)\in\setY^1\times\cdots\times\setY^n\}$, i.e., in which the feasible region is a Cartesian product … Read more