We study a Stackelberg game in which a government positions rapid response teams and thereafter a terrorist attacks a location on a line segment. We assume the damage associated to such an attack to be time dependent. We show that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that balances the possible damage on all intervals … Read more
Security of cyber networks is crucial; recent severe cyber-attacks have had a devastating effect on many large organizations. The attack graph, which maps the potential attack paths of a cyber network, is a popular tool for analyzing cyber system vulnerability. In this study, we propose a bi-level stochastic network interdiction model on an attack graph … Read more
We address a bilevel location problem where a leader first decides which facilities to open and their access prices; then, customers make individual decisions minimizing individual costs. In this note we prove that, when access costs do not fulfill metric properties, the problem is NP-hard even if facilities can be opened at no fixed cost. … Read more