We address an optimization problem in which two agents, each with a set of weighted items, compete in order to minimize the total weight of their solution sets. The latter are built according to a sequential game consisting in a fixed number of rounds. In every round each agent submits one item that may be … Read more
We present a game-theoretical dynamic model for competitive electricity markets.We demonstrate that the model can be used to systematically analyze the effects of ramp constraints, initial conditions, dynamic disturbances, forecast horizon, bidding frequency, and some other factors on the price signals.We illustrate the capabilities of the model using a numerical case study Article Download View … Read more
This paper presents a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints(SEPEC) model. Some source problems which motivate the model are discussed. Monte Carlo sampling method is applied to solve the SEPEC. The convergence analysis on the statistical estimators of Nash equilibria and Nash stationary points are presented. Article Download View Two stage stochastic equilibrium … Read more
We study the approximation of the least core value and the least core of supermodular cost cooperative games. We provide a framework for approximation based on oracles that approximately determine maximally violated constraints. This framework yields a (3 + \epsilon)-approximation algorithm for computing the least core value of supermodular cost cooperative games, and a polynomial-time … Read more
In 1951, Dantzig showed the equivalence of linear programming and two-person zero-sum games. However, in the description of his reduction from linear programming to zero-sum games, he noted that there was one case in which his reduction does not work. This also led to incomplete proofs of the relationship between the Minmax Theorem of game … Read more
We propose a fast population game dynamics, motivated by the analogy with infection and immunization processes within a population of “players,” for finding dominant sets, a powerful graph-theoretical notion of a cluster. Each step of the proposed dynamics is shown to have a linear time/space complexity and we show that, under the assumption of symmetric … Read more
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. We analyze natural classes of games that are induced by this … Read more
The multiobjective bilevel program is a sequence of two optimization problems where the upper level problem is multiobjective and the constraint region of the upper level problem is determined implicitly by the solution set to the lower level problem. In the case where the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition is necessary and sufficient for global optimality of … Read more
We address an optimization problem in which two agents, each with a set of weighted items, compete in order to maximize the total weight of their winning sets. The latter are built according to a sequential game consisting in a fixed number of rounds. In every round each agent submits one item for possible inclusion … Read more
Bargaining is a basic game in economic practice. Cournot duopoly game is an important model in bargaining theory. Recently, asymmetry information [20] and incomplete information [19], limited individual rationality [2] and slightly altruistic equilibrium [10] are introduced into bargaining theory. And computational game theory come into being a new research field. In this paper, we … Read more