A common strategy for solving an unconstrained two-player Nash equilibrium problem with continuous variables is applying Newton’s method to the system obtained by the corresponding first-order necessary optimality conditions. However, when taking into account the game dynamics, it is not clear what is the goal of each player when considering they are taking their current … Read more
A common strategy for solving an unconstrained two-player Nash equilibrium problem with continuous variables is applying Newton’s method to the system of nonlinear equations obtained by the corresponding first-order necessary optimality conditions. However, when taking into account the game dynamics, it is not clear what is the goal of each player when considering that they … Read more
We present multilinear and mixed-integer multilinear programs to find a Nash equilibrium in multi-player strategic-form games. We compare the formulations to common algorithms in Gambit, and conclude that a multilinear feasibility program finds a Nash equilibrium faster than any of the methods we compare it to, including the quantal response equilibrium method, which is recommended … Read more
This paper shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium of an n-player chance-constrained game for elliptically symmetric distributions. For a certain class of payoff functions, we suitably construct an equivalent mathematical program whose global maximizer is a Nash equilibrium. ArticleDownload View PDF
We consider an n-player non-cooperative game where each player has expected value payoff function and her strategy set is defined by a joint chance constraint. The random constraint vectors are independent. We propose a subset of probability distributions from elliptical family of distributions. We consider the case when the probability distribution of each random constraint … Read more
This paper studies an n-player non-cooperative game with strategy sets defined by stochastic linear constraints. The stochastic constraints of each player are jointly satisfied with a probability exceeding a given threshold. We consider the case where the row vectors defining the constraints are independent random vectors whose probability distributions are not completely known and belong … Read more
In this paper we extend a game theoretic meta-model used to assess the future of Paris agreement to the time horizon 2100 and we include in the strategic decisions of the negotiating coalitions the use of Carbon Dioxyde Removal (CDR) technologies. The meta-game model is calibrated through statistical emulation of GEMINI-E3, a world computable general … Read more
We consider a two player bimatrix game where the entries of the payoff matrices are random variables. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by considering that the payoff of each player is defined using a chance constraint. We consider the case where the entries of the payoff matrices are independent normal/Cauchy random variables. … Read more
We consider an n-player finite strategic game. The payoff vector of each player is a random vector whose distribution is not completely known. We assume that the distribution of a random payoff vector of each player belongs to a distributional uncertainty set. We define a distributionally robust chance-constrained game using worst-case chance constraint. We consider … Read more
We consider an n-player strategic game with finite action sets. The payoffs of each player are random variables. We assume that each player uses a satisficing payoff criterion defined by a chance-constraint, i.e., players face a chance- constrained game. We consider the cases where payoffs follow normal and elliptically symmetric distributions. For both cases we … Read more