A One-Extra Player Reduction of GNEPs to NEPs

It is common opinion that generalized Nash equilibrium problems are harder than Nash equilibrium problems. In this work, we show that by adding a new player, it is possible to reduce many generalized problems to standard equilibrium problems. The reduction holds for linear problems and smooth convex problems verifying a Slater-type condition. We also derive … Read more

Branch-and-Cut for Computing Approximate Equilibria of Mixed-Integer Generalized Nash Games

Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables constitute an important class of games in which each player solves a mixed-integer optimization problem, where both the objective and the feasible set is parameterized by the rivals’ strategies. However, such games are known for failing to admit exact equilibria and also the assumption of all players being … Read more

Dual equilibrium problems: how a succession of aspiration points converges to an equilibrium

We consider an equilibrium problem defined on a convex set, whose cost bifunction may not be monotone. We show that this problem can be solved by the inexact partial proximal method with quasi distance. As an application, at the psychological level of behavioral dynamics, this paper shows two points: i) how a dual equilibrium problem … Read more