Necessary optimality conditions for multiobjective bilevel programs

The multiobjective bilevel program is a sequence of two optimization problems where the upper level problem is multiobjective and the constraint region of the upper level problem is determined implicitly by the solution set to the lower level problem. In the case where the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition is necessary and sufficient for global optimality of … Read more

An novel ADM for finding Cournot equilibria of bargaining problem with alternating offers

Bargaining is a basic game in economic practice. Cournot duopoly game is an important model in bargaining theory. Recently, asymmetry information [20] and incomplete information [19], limited individual rationality [2] and slightly altruistic equilibrium [10] are introduced into bargaining theory. And computational game theory come into being a new research field. In this paper, we … Read more

Stochastic Nash Equilibrium Problems: Sample Average Approximation and Applications

This paper presents a Nash equilibrium model where the underlying objective functions involve uncertainty and nonsmoothness. The well known sample average approximation method is applied to solve the problem and the first order equilibrium conditions are characterized in terms of Clarke generalized gradients. Under some moderate conditions, it is shown that with probability one, a … Read more

A Branch-and-cut Algorithm for Integer Bilevel Linear Programs

We describe a rudimentary branch-and-cut algorithm for solving integer bilevel linear programs that extends existing techniques for standard integer linear programs to this very challenging computational setting. The algorithm improves on the branch-and-bound algorithm of Moore and Bard in that it uses cutting plane techniques to produce improved bounds, does not require specialized branching strategies, … Read more

The Price of Atomic Selfish Ring Routing

We study selfish routing in ring networks with respect to minimizing the maximum latency. Our main result is an establishement of constant bounds on the price of stability (PoS) for routing unsplittable flows with linear latency. We show that the PoS is at most 6.83, which reduces to 4:57 when the linear latency functions are … Read more

Parimutuel Betting on Permutations

We focus on a permutation betting market under parimutuel call auction model where traders bet on the final ranking of n candidates. We present a Proportional Betting mechanism for this market. Our mechanism allows the traders to bet on any subset of the n x n ‘candidate-rank’ pairs, and rewards them proportionally to the number … Read more

First-order algorithm with (ln(1/\epsilon))$ convergence for $\epsilonhBcequilibrium in two-person zero-sum games

We propose an iterated version of Nesterov’s first-order smoothing method for the two-person zero-sum game equilibrium problem $$\min_{x\in Q_1} \max_{y\in Q_2} \ip{x}{Ay} = \max_{y\in Q_2} \min_{x\in Q_1} \ip{x}{Ay}.$$ This formulation applies to matrix games as well as sequential games. Our new algorithmic scheme computes an $\epsilon$-equilibrium to this min-max problem in $\Oh(\kappa(A) \ln(1/\epsilon))$ first-order iterations, … Read more

Smoothing techniques for computing Nash equilibria of sequential games

We develop first-order smoothing techniques for saddle-point problems that arise in the Nash equilibria computation of sequential games. The crux of our work is a construction of suitable prox-functions for a certain class of polytopes that encode the sequential nature of the games. An implementation based on our smoothing techniques computes approximate Nash equilibria for … Read more

Linear Programming for Mechanism Design: An Application to Bidder Collusion at First-Price Auctions

We demonstrate the use of linear programming techniques in the analysis of mechanism design problems. We use these techniques to analyze the extent to which a first-price auction is robust to collusion when, contrary to some prior literature on collusion at first-price auctions, the cartel cannot prevent its members from bidding at the auction. In … Read more