An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem

We propose a novel method to fi nd Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The reformulation off ers a new approach to obtain and … Read more

The cone condition and nonsmoothness in linear generalized Nash games

We consider linear generalized Nash games and introduce the so-called cone condition which characterizes the smoothness of the Nikaido-Isoda function under weak assumptions. The latter mapping arises from a reformulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem as a possibly nonsmooth optimization problem. Other regularity conditions like LICQ or SMFC(Q) are only sufficient for smoothness, but … Read more

Achieving Cost-Effective Power Grid Hardening through Transmission Network Topology Control

Vulnerability of power grid is a critical issue in power industry. In order to understand and reduce power grid vulnerability under threats, existing research often employs defender-attacker-defender (DAD) models to derive effective protection plans and evaluate grid performances under various contingencies. Transmission line switching (also known as topology control) is an effective operation to mitigate … Read more

A close look at auxiliary problem principles for equilibria

The auxiliary problem principle allows solving a given equilibrium problem (EP) through an equivalent auxiliary problem with better properties. The paper investigates two families of auxiliary EPs: the classical auxiliary problems, in which a regularizing term is added to the equilibrium bifunction, and the regularized Minty EPs. The conditions that ensure the equivalence of a … Read more

Justification of Constrained Game Equilibrium Models

We consider an extension of a noncooperative game where players have joint binding constraints. In this model, the constrained equilibrium can not be implemented within the same noncooperative framework and requires some other additional regulation procedures. We consider several approaches to resolution of this problem. In particular, a share allocation method is presented and substantiated. … Read more

On the shortest path game

In this work we address a game theoretic variant of the shortest path problem, in which two decision makers (agents/players) move together along the edges of a graph from a given starting vertex to a given destination. The two players take turns in deciding in each vertex which edge to traverse next. The decider in … Read more

Scheduling the Tasks of Two Agents with a Central Selection Mechanism

We address a class of deterministic scheduling problems in which two agents compete for the usage of a single machine. The agents have their own objective functions and submit in each round an arbitrary, unprocessed task from their buffer for possible selection. In each round the smaller of the two submitted tasks is chosen and … Read more

Computation of Stochastic Nash Equilibrium via Variable Sample Distributed Methods

In this paper, we propose a variable sample distributed algorithm for the computation of stochastic Nash equilibrium in which the objective functions are replaced, at each iteration, by sample average approximations. We investigate the contraction mapping properties of the variable sample distributed algorithm and show that the accuracy of estimators yielded in the algorithms to … Read more

Dynamic Cost Allocation for Economic Lot Sizing Games

We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot sizing problem with concave ordering costs over a finite time horizon, in which each player faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. We show how to compute a dynamic cost allocation in the strong sequential core of this … Read more

Dynamic Linear Programming Games with Risk-Averse Players

Motivated by situations in which independent agents, or players, wish to cooperate in some uncertain endeavor over time, we study dynamic linear programming games, which generalize classical linear production games to multi-period settings under uncertainty. We specifically consider that players may have risk-averse attitudes towards uncertainty, and model this risk aversion using coherent conditional risk … Read more